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Raymond T. Smith Copyright 2000: All Rights Reserved Go To Site Map |
THE
ECONOMY IT is clear from the previous chapters that economic factors have been of great importance in shaping the growth of Guianese society. It was European capital and the existence of European markets for tropical produce that stimulated the creation of a new society on the South American mainland; it was in the plantation cultivation of sugar and other crops that Europeans, Africans, Indians, Portuguese, and Chinese had their first contacts. Of more importance still is the fact that effective control of the economy has been, and still is to a large extent, located outside the country. In this chapter we shall try to sketch the main outlines of the economy, to explore some of its interrelations with other social phenomena, and to discuss some of the problems of ‘development’. Like most ‘underdeveloped’ countries, British Guiana is a primary producer, selling her products overseas and relying on imports to meet her requirements of manufactured goods. Her primary products are few in number. The bulk of exports consist of raw sugar, rice, unprocessed bauxite, and timber. Out of a total value of exports of domestic produce in 1959 of $101,985,268, sugar and sugar preparations accounted for $48,702,237 or 47.7 per cent.; cereals and cereal preparations (mainly rice) for $13,844,809 or 13.6 per cent.; metalliferous ores and metal scrap (mainly bauxite) for $25,281,788 or 24.8 per cent.; wood, lumber, and cork for $3,604,309 or 3.5 per cent. These four items alone constituted 89.6 per cent. of the value of all exports. It is the income generated within these export industries, in the form of wages, that pays for the considerable imports of manufactured goods, and even food, on which the country depends at present. The total value of imports of food, beverages, and tobacco in 1959 was $23,834,921 and of manufactured goods and machinery $55,352,812.[1] The inherent weakness of an economy which relies so heavily upon the export of one or two commodities is obvious; any fluctuation in the market for these products immediately reacts upon the whole Guianese economy and its effect is multiplied many times. AGRICULTURE In terms of the value of production, number of wage-earners employed, and of general influence sugar is the most important industry in the country. It is the industry upon which Guiana has always depended and while there is a sense in which its main outlines have changed little during the past hundred years or so, there has been a continuous process of modification in its internal structure. The industry has always been based upon the growing of cane, the extraction of juice and the first stages of processing; processing does not extend beyond the production of crude sugar crystals, molasses, and rum;[2] the plantation has always been the main unit of production with only negligible quantities of cane being produced by small farmers; and finally the industry has always depended upon some form of preferential treatment in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth markets to keep it going at anything like a fair level of prosperity. While these overall characteristics of the industry have remained fairly constant there have been great changes in its internal organization. No less far reaching in its consequences than the transition from slavery to freedom and the growth of a complex racial pattern through the importation of labour,[3] has been the gradual consolidation of plantations into large units and the aggregation of control of most of the industry by one large company. In 1829 there were 230 plantations, owned by almost as many owners, producing about 50,000 tons of sugar per annum. In 1958 there were eighteen plantations controlled by two companies and one small independent plantation. This small number of large and more efficient estates produced 306,361 tons of sugar. Many of the plantations that were operating in 1829 passed into the hands of small farmers who grow subsistence crops or rice; others were abandoned and the rest were forced into consolidation and greater efficiency to meet strong competition and insecure markets. One of the most fascinating aspects of this process has been the growth of Bookers’ Sugar Estates Ltd. Today out of the nineteen sugar estates in British Guiana, fifteen are operated by this company, a subsidiary of Booker Brothers, McConnell & Company, Ltd. This latter is a London-based company with interests in Nyasaland, Canada, Trinidad, Jamaica, the Rhodesias, Nigeria, South Africa, and Britain. Its main subsidiaries are in British Guiana and it is here that the company made its start through the trading and planting activities of its founder, Josias Booker. The sugar and rum branches of the main company are its real backbone, but today other activities cover an extremely wide field, from shipping and retail trading to printing, cattle ranching, and balata production. The structure and influence of the Booker Group is discussed separately below, but a realization of its manifold activities is essential to an appreciation of the present-day sugar industry.
*Estates
with an
operating
sugar
factory. Source:
G.B.,
Commission
of Inquiry
into the
Sugar
Industry of
British
Guiana,
1949, Report
(Col.
No. 249), p.
172, but
brought up
to date. Writing in 1949 the members of the Commission of Inquiry into the Sugar Industry of British Guiana[4] reported that the then twenty-one sugar estates covered an area of 155,000 acres of which 25,000 acres were covered by buildings, foreshore, bush, water, and swamp. Another 20,000 acres was being fallowed at any one time, 18,000 acres were under rice, ground provisions, coconuts, and other crops, and 30,000 acres were used for grazing. At any one time the area under cane was no more than 60,000 acres and the yield was about 180,000 tons of sugar.[5] In 1959 cane was harvested from 86,877 acres of estate land and the yield was 284,425 tons, or approximately 3.3 tons of sugar per acre. This increased production has been mainly due to the favourable prices obtaining under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, which has in turn stimulated the companies to make extensive replacements of old equipment. The most noticeable change in the sugar industry during the past ten years has been the enormous increase in efficiency through centralization of control and planning. The common practice during the last hundred years and until quite recently has been for each sugar estate to be under the direct control of a resident manager, supervised in a general way by a Georgetown attorney responsible to the owners, who normally lived in Britain. The manager was the head of the estate hierarchy and was in many respects similar to a petty chieftain, having almost unlimited power within his estate. Sugar estate lands have never been brought within the local government system so that residents have never paid rates, sat on local councils, or been responsible for any of their own public amenities. The managers have controlled not only the industrial organization of the estates but the community and social life of the resident workers as well. Not more than ten years ago estate managers held formal ‘courts’ in which they arbitrated private disputes between resident workers.[6] Each manager was responsible for the planning of every aspect of production on his estate, being assisted by his chemist, factory and field managers, and engineers. As the overall control of the sugar industry gradually passed into the hands of Bookers and the Demerara Company, it became convenient for more services to be provided by central organizations. A good deal of research on sugar cultivation had been done by government-employed agronomists and other technical people, but gradually the companies, both individually and through the Sugar Producers’ Association, realizing the great importance of a scientific agriculture with more emphasis upon research, began to build up their own organizations. In the first phase these were still services provided for the managers to assist them in improving their estates. In the latest stage of this development control is shifting away from the individual estate manager to a highly efficient central bureaucracy in Georgetown. This is most noticeable in the case of Bookers’ Sugar Estates Ltd, where the central organization plans the phased production pattern for each estate and so arranges the flow of cane and processed sugar that there will be no delays in the factories or on the shipping wharves. Highly efficient cost-accounting procedures are removing the individual manager’s financial control as well. Along with the streamlining of managerial control and the application of the most up-to-date methods of scientific agriculture, there has been an increase in the use of machinery. Throughout the nineteenth century, and most of the twentieth so far, one major problem of the sugar planters was to secure an adequate supply of labour. As long ago as the 1830’s there was discussion of how to replace labour by steam power but the heavy soils, and probably the lack of capital for heavy investment, as well as the absence of efficient machines, conspired against mechanization of field operations. Instead the planters concentrated on maintaining a large supply of labour in and around the plantations. Until quite recently it was a common complaint, and not without substance, that the sugar interests used their considerable influence to block any economic developments which would result in a drain of labour away from the sugar estates. But the picture is changing. Rapid population growth coupled with the increasing use of machines for field operations means that there are more people seeking fewer jobs. So far as the sugar industry is concerned, this trend is likely to continue since there is a limit placed upon substantial expansion of production by world agreements. The enormous differences between a highly centralized agricultural industry and one with a large number of producers and little central control is dramatically illustrated by the contrast of the sugar and rice industries. Both are export industries and both are large employers of labour. In 1957, according to one estimate,[7] the sugar industry produced approximately 285,000 tons of sugar valued at $58¼ million with approximately 25,000 employees, while in the same year only 79,000 tons of rice valued at about $17 million were produced by 22,000 rice farmers assisted by a good deal of family and other paid labour. Furthermore rice was estimated to occupy about 137,000 acres as opposed to 81,108 acres under sugar in 1957. Since the First World War the production of rice has increased steadily and rice farming has come to provide a basis for the household economy of large numbers of families, particularly East Indians. Although rice is thought of as an Indian crop, because of the greater number of Indian farmers, Negroes have been growing rice in British Guiana for at least 200 years and the recent favourable prices have induced many Negro farmers to plant rice on land that was previously abandoned. Apart from the government-operated plantation at Mahaicony-Abary, rice is essentially a small farmer’s crop, as can be seen from the following table referring to the 1954 autumn crop. The few really large farms are mostly in the Mahaica-Mahaicony area where drainage and irrigation is poor, large areas of land are planted and reaped by machinery, and the yield per acre is correspondingly low.
Source: C.
O’Loughlin,
‘The Rice
Sector in
the Economy
of British
Guiana’, Social
and Economic
Studies,
vii
(1958). The typical Guianese rice farmer cultivates about five acres of rice land, some of it probably being leased from a large landowner, or from the government, and some being freehold land. Recent legislation has standardized rents for given types of land and afforded more security of tenure.[8] It is unlikely that the farmer will devote the whole of his time to rice cultivation. Apart from growing a few other crops for home consumption and the local market, and keeping a cow, pigs, goats, or fowls, he probably works occasionally for cash wages on a near‑by sugar estate or on public works projects. Or he may have a small shop or a trade such as barbering as a sideline. Where drainage and irrigation is good it is not uncommon to plant two crops of rice each year. The main crop is planted at the beginning of the long rainy season around April or May and is reaped in October. In 1957 about 15,500 acres were planted for the ‘small crop’ which is reaped in the spring. Despite the increasing use of mechanical equipment in recent years the majority of farmers still use methods of cultivation little different from those their ancestors used in India. Light ox-drawn ploughs and harrows are used for preparing the land, and seedlings are transplanted by hand. Reaping too is most usually a hand operation, and threshing is done by teams of bulls which tread out the grain from the straw. These methods of cultivation are only suitable when small areas of land are being worked by family labour. In absolute terms the results are inefficient, but there is no other use for the labour at present, and by these labour intensive methods high yields of up to 2,000 lb. of rice per acre can be achieved on good lands. In January 1953 the British Guiana Rice Development Company was established under government control to take over the old government rice development schemes in the Mahaicony–Abary area. The object of this company was to demonstrate the advantages of large-scale mechanical cultivation and large-scale milling. It has done good work of an experimental nature, and has provided some services such as machinery-hire and milling facilities to farmers in the area. As a commercial venture it has been a total failure. Milling has always been something of a problem in British Guiana; in 1959 there were 208 mills in operation most of which were very small units consisting of a concrete area for sun-drying the padi, a rough corrugated-iron warehouse, a boiler to produce steam for par-boiling, and one or more hullers. These mills can produce a reasonably nutritious grade of rice, but they are inefficient in that they waste many milling by-products, are unable to produce polished rice, and depend on sunny weather for drying. To counteract some of these deficiencies the Rice Development Company has established two large central mills and has plans for building more. It is through the Rice Marketing Board that a real control of the industry can be exercised. First formed in 1939 to regulate exports and prices of rice during the war, the Board is now the sole exporter of rice. All rice produced in the country must be sold to it, apart from small quantities which farmers are permitted to retain for domestic use and for seed and stock-feed. The Board grades farmers’ rice upon receipt and pays accordingly, a procedure which invariably produces complaints of ‘down-grading’. During the crop year ending 30 September 1959, estimated total production was 104,000 tons, of which 53,873 tons were consumed locally and 51,127 tons exported. The rice industry has grown to its present size on the basis of a steady local demand and an export market close at hand in the other British West Indian territories. British Guiana rice was able to establish itself in these territories partly through the entrepreneurial activities of one or two Guianese merchants, but mainly because of the drying up of alternative sources of supply during the two world wars. It is not cheap compared with rice from the Far East even when allowance has been made for shipping costs. At present the bulk of exports is sold to the territories of the West Indies Federation by the Rice Marketing Board on the basis of price and quantity agreements negotiated between the British Guiana and the federal governments at a periodical conference. Small quantities have been sold to some of the Dutch West Indian territories and attempts are being made to develop some trade with Venezuela, but without the West Indian market the outlook would be bleak. The fact that British Guiana does not at present produce the polished white rice so much preferred by consumers makes it extremely difficult to break into new markets. Because of British Guiana’s position in relation to the West Indies Federation,[9] the negotiation of marketing agreements with the chief purchaser of the country’s rice, tends to become a political as well as an economic matter. The West Indian territories claim that through the price agreements and the guaranteed market they are extending to British Guiana the kind of treatment that could only be expected by a full member of the federation. If British Guiana does not join, they argue, then the member countries would be justified in buying rice from the cheapest source, and in developing their own rice industries as quickly as possible. Many of British Guiana’s rice farmers foolishly imagine that they can extract a rising standard of living from a static industry by political means. Whether British Guiana joins the federation or not will probably make little difference to the marketing problem in the long run. What is needed is increased economic efficiency in the industry and an ability to produce the kind of rice that customers will buy. Sugar and rice are the only crops with any substantial export market. Most other agricultural production is for local consumption, though some small surpluses may be exported. Experiments are being made with some export crops such as cocoa and cotton but production is small as yet. Coconuts constitute one of the most important crops for local use, there being about 34,000 acres planted with coconut trees in 1959. The bulk of the production from these trees goes into the local manufacture of edible oil, soap, margarine, and compound lard. The production of food for local consumption has always been regarded as being secondary to the main task of growing sugar or rice, and in the days of acute labour shortage it was far more profitable to import food from Canada and the United States rather than waste precious man-hours growing it at home. Only in the very recent past has attention been given to the development of better varieties of food crops and improved techniques of cultivation. The business of raising ground provisions, fruit, and other vegetables continues to be a spare-time activity with most farmers. Tastes which have developed over a century or more continue a preference for the starchy foods combined with imported salt-fish or salt-meat; for luxury occasions canned meat or fish is highly favoured. Leafy green vegetables are rarely eaten except by East Indians who usually keep a kitchen garden, or by members of the urban middle class. There is obviously much scope for the extension of farming for local consumption, to replace imports, to provide for a rapidly growing population, and to effect a greater variety in the diet. Livestock of various kinds are important in the local economy but as in the case of food crops there is room for a considerable expansion and improvement of production. Beef cattle are raised in the savannah areas and some meat is now flown down from an abattoir at Lethem to the Georgetown markets. Dairy cattle and draught cattle are to be found in the coastal area but shortage of grazing land in this intensively cultivated region sets a limit upon their production. Large quantities of milk are still imported despite the opening of a pasteurization plant in Georgetown. The problem of increasing supplies from local sources lies as much in the field of marketing as in that of production. Most livestock on the coast are kept by farmers who have a few cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or poultry as a source of subsidiary income or as a form of savings. To collect milk supplies from a very large number of small producers, or to ensure a steady flow of small stock into the market is extremely difficult. One of the most promising lines of development in the production of local food supplies has been the recent expansion, on government initiative, of supplies of fresh fish. Fish has always been an important part of the local diet and most rural families possess nets for fishing in the numerous drainage trenches and rivers. Until recently sea fishing was confined to the coastal shallows and the catches of the small boats were quite inadequate to supply local demand. Prices too were necessarily high because of the relatively small scale of the operation. In order to improve the supply of fresh fish the government has carried out experimental deep-sea trawling, set up a modern Wholesale Fish Market in Georgetown, and encouraged the development of fish farming in the rural areas. MINING Mining is playing an increasingly important part in the Guianese economy and is beginning to provide some justification for the claim that British Guiana has ‘vast untapped natural resources’. When gold and diamonds were first worked on a commercial scale in the 1880’s all eyes were quickly turned towards the interior lands of the colony. Discussions and public meetings were held in Georgetown on the relative merits of roads and railways for opening up the country; no one doubted that one or the other would soon be built. The alluvial deposits of gold, silver, and diamonds proved to be less rich than had been hoped. After 1893 the returns began to fall off and despite a lingering interest in interior development very little public money has been spent on it. Today the gold and diamond industries are quite small and are dominated by one or two companies. Of 16,491 bullion oz. of gold produced in 1957 a total of 10,578 oz. was produced by one company’s dredge and about 4,000 oz. by small miners. In 1959 only 3,448 oz. were produced because British Guiana Consolidated Goldfields Ltd. were placed on a care and maintenance basis while they were under examination by another company. In the same year diamond production almost doubled from 33,091 to 62,328 carats as a result of the remarkable find in the Kurupung, and the number of small miners increased from the 1957 total of l,900 to about 5,000. Many of these men make only an occasional trip to the interior and are sometimes financed by the dealers who contract to buy their diamonds. Though gold and diamonds have not fulfilled their early promise, other less glamorous minerals have begun to yield great wealth. In 1914 the Demerara Bauxite Company was formed by American and Canadian aluminium interests and began to exploit the rich deposits situated some 60–70 miles up the Demerara river. The scale of operations has grown considerably over the years, with a rapid acceleration during the Second World War, until in 1957 colony production totalled 2,201,903 long tons. Most of this was produced by the Demerara Bauxite Company Ltd. (now a subsidiary of Aluminium Ltd., and complementary to the Aluminium Company of Canada), from its mine at Mackenzie, Demerara river. Although several companies have concessions and exploration licences, the only other company producing bauxite is the Reynolds Metals Company operating at Kwakwani, up the Berbice river. The Reynolds mine produced 225,023 long tons in 1957, as opposed to 1,976,880 long tons from the Mackenzie mine. In 1958-9 production by both companies was cut back sharply because of the United States recession and a local strike; total production in 1959 was 1,674,416 tons. Most of British Guiana’s bauxite is shipped as raw ore to the parent companies’ plants in Canada and the United States, but a small proportion is calcined and the Demerara Bauxite Company has started the erection of an alumina plant at Mackenzie. Compared to Jamaica, where a bauxite industry was established as recently as 1942, British Guiana derives little benefit from its bauxite industry. Apart from the existence of a large alumina plant in Jamaica itself, the companies operating there engage in a number of extremely valuable side activities. These range from stock farming and poultry rearing on lands covered by their concessions to the stimulation of cottage industries such as craft weaving on aluminium hand-looms. In British Guiana no such activities have taken place because the mining concession covered previously unpopulated land. The companies have established mining towns in which excellent provision is made for workers’ accommodation, health, and recreation but they are necessarily small and the total effect of the bauxite industry on employment figures is not very significant. The excellent amenities of these bauxite towns are somewhat diminished by the existence of a virtual colour bar between the mainly imported supervisory staff and the Guianese workers. It can be, and is, argued that the distinctions are between different grades of staff, that the high fence around the ‘compound’ is to afford protection against thieves, and that the provision of separate clubs and swimming pools is also a matter of differential amenities according to grade. But the fact remains that the atmosphere of the mining camps is more like that of the southern United States than of the rest of British Guiana. Apart from the provision of welfare amenities for their staffs, the bauxite companies confine their activities to the extraction and shipping of ore. The royalties and export duties paid to the government are extremely low, being 25 and 45 cents (B.G.) per long ton respectively, making a total yield to the government revenue of only 2s. 11½d. per long ton. Since the price of raw ore can only be fixed quite arbitrarily owing to the absence of an open market, the income-tax yield is also very low. The existence of rich and extensive deposits of bauxite gives some substance to the idea that British Guiana will be able to develop industries of her own. At the present time she can hardly hope to launch upon a full-scale aluminium industry (apart from anything else she lacks the cheap power necessary for smelting), but she can press the mining companies to carry out an increasing amount of processing within the country, thereby securing capital investment in plant as well as an extension of training in mechanical and managerial skills that Guianese need so desperately. Jamaica has shown what skillful negotiation can yield in the form of increased government revenue from bauxite operations. The other minerals for which mining operations are being developed are manganese and columbite-tantalite, though operations on the latter minerals are still in the exploration and experimental stage. Manganese mining is in process of development at a site in the North-West District, and by the end of 1958 the operating company had partially completed a short railway from the mine to a nearby river. It was hoped that mining would begin by 1960. No other minerals are being actively worked at present but exploration is taking place and discoveries of further useful deposits may reasonably be expected. Much of the interior is still inaccessible and only sketchily surveyed, despite the valuable work of the very small government Geological Survey Department. TIMBER Flying over British Guiana gives a very good impression of the extent of her forest cover. The green sea seems to roll on endlessly, broken only by the savannahs and the coastal plain. These extensive forests contain a large variety of tropical woods including the durable, and therefore valuable, hardwood, Greenheart (Ocotea rodiaei). Timber exports totalled 2,494,200 cubic feet in 1959 valued at $3,363,250 and the bulk of this consisted of Greenheart destined for Britain and the United States where it is used for marine piles and pit props. Until quite recently, when concrete became fashionable, houses and even large public buildings were built of wood. Georgetown with its broad streets and delightful wooden buildings which seem to float white and graceful on their pile foundations is easily the most pleasing of the cities in the British Caribbean. The change to concrete is being forced because of the costly fires which have periodically destroyed whole sections of Georgetown, and it seems likely that the lightness and freedom of the wooden buildings will be replaced by the solidity and architectural deadness of ferro-concrete cubes. Even the huge and fantastic pseudo-Gothic Anglican cathedral, long cherished as the supposedly highest wooden building in the world, will have to go eventually. Perhaps by then tropical architecture will have come into its own and a more fitting replacement will be built. Apart from the building timbers (which will continue to be used in the rural areas for a long time yet), and the high quality hardwoods, the forests contain trees which are useful for pulping and for the manufacture of chipboard. A company was formed some years ago to manufacture chipboard and is still in operation though its activities were seriously hampered during 1960 by lack of electric power to operate its machines and it was forced to close down at one stage. It is now in production again and promises to be a success. The Columbian Corporation of America leased half a million acres in 1959 and announced its intention to invest $20 million in a wood-pulp industry.[10] Improvement in the milling, drying, and chemical treatment of various woods has been stimulated by the government processing plant in Georgetown. Forests are obviously one of British Guiana’s major assets, capable of considerable development as soon as communications are improved. MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRY Apart from sugar factories, rice mills, and saw mills, there are few manufacturing concerns in British Guiana. In recent years a small ‘industrial area’ has been developing just outside Georgetown but so far the industries are of the type which caters to a small market and can be operated on a small scale. A brewery, margarine, and common-soap factory, a biscuit factory and an oxygen-acetylene plant are the most important. Other local industries include the small-scale manufacture of ice, soft drinks, matches, some articles of clothing such as shirts, cigarettes, drugs and patent medicines, and printing. Rum is an important export, of course, and is manufactured as a by-product of sugar. Small quantities of gin are manufactured, mainly for local consumption. Foundries for the repair of sugar mills and general machinery have long existed and in recent years the ship-repair yards have begun to build some excellent small vessels for coastal and river use. As in any town of moderate size Georgetown is supplied with garages, laundries, dry‑cleaners, repair and maintenance shops of various kinds, and a number of small food-processing concerns. Good quality furniture is made from local woods but it is made by small independent tradesmen who are extremely conservative in design and techniques. The Industries Division of the Social Welfare Department has done something to try to improve designs, but much room for improvement remains. This organization has now been reformed as the Minor Industries Unit of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and is actively engaged in the establishment of new, but as yet unprofitable industries using local raw materials. The most important developments in manufacturing have been the recent start on the construction of an alumina plant at Mackenzie and the announcement of plans to establish a wood-pulp industry. There are numerous possibilities for the development of industries using local materials such as timber, local clays and silica, cane and grasses, metals and even bagasse (the sugar-cane fibres which are at present burned as fuel when the juice has been extracted). A mission of United Kingdom industrialists which visited the colony in 1952, and the World Bank Mission which reported in 1953 both drew attention to the problems of marketing, of capital investment, and of the provision of skilled labour and supervisory personnel.[11] Markets are probably the major problem. It is easy enough to forsee the development of small industries making things such as builders’ hardware, floor-tiles, concrete blocks, knitted vests and shoes, and other commodities for the immediate market, but such a limited development of industry could not possibly create enough employment to ease the pressure on the land or to satisfy the aspirations of Guianese for higher living standards. The development of export markets, and entry into the world pattern of exchange as something more than the producer of primary agricultural products is essential to meet these demands. COMMUNICATIONS Guianese, like Brazilians, have long been convinced that the key to the future prosperity of their country lies in opening up the hinterland. The same problem of finding means of settling the country even if communications are established exists in both countries, but British Guiana cannot afford the grand gesture of a Brasilia. So far interior communications have followed the very limited settlement. Cattle ranchers established a trail from the savannahs to the coast which has now been partially superseded by an air service carrying beef from an abattoir at Lethem in the Rupununi to Georgetown. However, freight rates are high and many cattle are still driven down the trail. The government maintains about 400 miles of trails across the savannahs which are usable in the dry season for linking the ranches, Government Posts and airstrips, and the Amerindian settlements. This network of trails is navigable by jeep and truck and is gradually being improved. Farther north a natural soil-surfaced road system runs south from the river town of Bartica for some 200 miles to the gold and diamond mining areas on the Potaro and Mazaruni rivers. This road is well maintained, is negotiable by truck, and crosses a number of excellent bridges. Although these roads and trails make the interior accessible after a journey by river steamer or plane from the coast, a trip to the interior is still regarded as something of an adventure in exploration. In the past numerous schemes have been put forward for the construction of roads or railways linking Georgetown with the southernmost part of the country where it borders on Brazil. The most ambitious of these were current between 1880 and 1914, the period of the gold and diamond boom. Several offers were made to build railways to the Brazil border by private firms but the concessions required from the government were always considered to be too high. One of the most persistent and charming of Guianese folktales relates how Henry Ford I once offered to build a road from Georgetown into Brazil in exchange for a ten-year monopoly on motor vehicles. It is said that a short-sighted and pedantic Colonial Office rejected the offer. At the present time a plan is being implemented which, because of the modesty of its aims, may prove to be a good beginning. The idea is to build soil-surfaced link roads between the coastal road system, the Bartica-Potaro road system, and the savannah trails. Such a road system would be of limited use but would provide a basis for future development, and once it became possible to drive from Georgetown to Lethem an entirely new attitude towards the interior lands would develop. Ten years ago it was considered to be something of an adventure to drive across the Sahara; today it is commonplace. If British Guiana waits for population to move inland before developing its communications further it will have to wait a very long time, whereas the existence of easy communication with Georgetown might encourage settlement, and would certainly stimulate interest. Any discussion of roads in British Guiana always reverts to the dreadful state of the coast roads. Guianese are firmly convinced that they have the worst roads in the world; this is not true by any means, but they are certainly worse than most in the British Caribbean. When the first roads were built linking together the plantations along the coast at the end of the eighteenth century, their main purpose was to enable troops to move quickly to the scene of slave rebellions. Originally each plantation was responsible for the maintenance of that section of the Public Road which passed through it. After emancipation, when many of the plantations had been bought by groups of freedmen, the roads were often neglected and some of the earliest local government legislation was enacted to enforce contributions to road maintenance. But then, as now, the bulk of agricultural produce was transported by other routes. Sugar has always been conveyed by barge from the plantations to the wharves of Georgetown or to New Amsterdam before it ceased to be an important port. Rice travels by rail except on the Courantyne and Essequibo coasts where trucks are important, and it is significant that the Courantyne coast was the first part of the country, apart from the towns, to get a modern asphalt motor road. Because of the absence of stone along the coast and the supposed difficulty of transporting it from the interior,[12] the practice developed of metalling the coast roads with ‘burnt earth’; that is, with clay which has been burnt to brick in a specially constructed ‘heap’. Of the 260 miles of coast roads in existence today, 75 miles are surfaced with asphalt and the remainder with burnt earth. For more than 150 years the process of laying and rolling the broken brick has been repeated. Every dry season the brick crumbles into a fine powder which rises in great clouds behind every passing vehicle; in the rainy season whatever remains is washed away leaving a surface pitted with holes of various sizes. These are duly filled with new brick as soon as it is available. The Public Works Department of the central government long ago took over responsibility for the upkeep of the main roads and the annual cycle of road repair has come to be an integral part of the rural economy. ‘Road work’ is a form of outdoor relief, with somewhat richer pickings for the contractors who supply the burnt earth. Inconvenient though it may be for the owners of motor cars to travel over these country roads, their condition does not, as yet, lead to any serious dislocation of the country’s economy. As was pointed out above, the bulk of agricultural produce travels by water or by rail and the same is true of the food and manufactures which go to the rural shops. The roads (except on the Courantyne and Essequibo coasts) are used mainly for passenger transport. Fleets of taxis ply up and down the coast carrying passengers at moderate fares much more quickly than they can travel by rail or by the few buses which used to be very unreliable. The government has now set up a special Roads Division as a separate sub-department within the Public Works Department in an attempt to improve and expedite the road-construction programme. The improvement of the coast roads, and particularly the road from the airport to Georgetown, is a matter of national pride as much as hard economic necessity; the development of roads into the interior would be an act of faith in the future development of the country. The World Bank Mission took the view that the improvement of the existing coast road and its feeders to cope with the volume of traffic now using them must be a primary consideration, and their advice has been acted upon. This view was consonant with their general idea that the development of the interior must be deferred until the coastal area has been fully exploited. British Guiana has two short stretches of railway which were established as long ago as 1848. The first runs between Georgetown and Rosignol, opposite New Amsterdam, is 60.5 miles long and has a 4’ 8½" gauge. The other runs from Vreed-en-Hoop, opposite Georgetown, to Parika on the bank of the Essequibo river, is 18.5 miles long, and has a gauge of 3’ 6". Since 1919 they have been operated by the government Transport and Harbours Department and have proved to be a constant drain upon government revenue. The uneconomic nature of their operation has largely been due to lack of capital for proper maintenance and equipment and not to competition from road transport as is sometimes supposed. Both railway lines are used mainly for carrying workpeople to and from Georgetown, for the transport of rice into Georgetown, and the transport of shop goods into the rural areas. It is realized that even if the railways are eventually made redundant by the development of road transport this stage will not be reached for many years. In the meantime a programme of modernization and improved efficiency of the existing lines has been undertaken. Some of the obstacles to long-distance travel through the forest area have been overcome by the development of air transport. Starting as a small private company in 1934, British Guiana Airways built up an internal air network between Georgetown and a number of landing strips and creeks in the interior. This was, and still is to a large extent, ‘bush flying’ in the Canadian and Australian sense and the founder of B.G. Airways was an American, Major A. Williams. Most of the interior airstrips are just clearings in the bush though in recent years some of them have been considerably improved and are reliable even in the rainy season. At Lethem a radio beacon has been installed to facilitate bad weather landings. The government has now taken over the company (which was always heavily subsidized), and in 1957 maintained twenty-one airstrips and forty-three water alighting areas, the latter being used by the Airway’s amphibious Grumman ‘Goose’ aircraft. Not all of these landing places are in regular use, but a number of scheduled services are operated to seven points in the interior. The company also does a brisk trade in charter flights carrying parties from Georgetown for picnics in the interior, including a flight over the renowned Kaieteur Fall. British Guiana’s international airport, Atkinson Field, is a legacy of the American ‘occupation’. It was built during the war and used as a take-off point for the ferrying of aircraft to North Africa. It is a fine airfield twenty-five miles from Georgetown and is used by airlines connecting it with Trinidad (which is the main West Indian link with the rest of the world), with French and Dutch Guiana, and with Boa Vista and Manaos in northern Brazil. This latter link could become quite important in the future since the route from Europe and North America to this region of Brazil is much shorter through Georgetown than through the more southerly ports in Brazil itself. Great hindrances to surface travel in British Guiana are the numerous rivers, streams, and swamps. Where the rivers or streams are navigable they can be exploited as means of transport, of course, but the transfer from road or rail to water and back again is often time-consuming and tedious. To travel from Georgetown to the Essequibo coast by car it is necessary to cross the Demerara river by ferry, drive twenty miles along the west coast of Demerara, and then board another steamer which sails around the large islands of Wakenaam and Leguan which lie in the mouth of the Essequibo river before one arrives at Suddie some hours later. Owing to the heavy demand for space on the ferries it is necessary to book one’s car well in advance, so that every journey takes on the flavour of an expedition. The ferry boats are much too small to cope with the amount of traffic and none of them were built to carry cars. A number of new vessels have been ordered and this is expected to relieve the situation. If the development of the country follows anything like the anticipated pace it will certainly be necessary to make tremendous improvements in the handling capacity and turnabout speed of the main ferries. From time to time schemes are put forward for the bridging of the Demerara river. This would be a most desirable thing to do but it is difficult to imagine one of the largest and most expensive bridges in the world across a river flanked on one side by a city with a population of a little over 100,000 and on the other by an agricultural area without electricity, sewage disposal, domestic piped water, or even a properly paved highway. None the less the project is periodically debated with great seriousness in the legislature and the daily newspapers take up the argument in leader articles bristling with statistics and estimates. Postal, telephone, telegraph, and radio-telephone communications are all being developed to meet new requirements and a programme of improvement has been in progress for a number of years. Georgetown now has an automatic telephone exchange but the number of lines to the rural areas is still inadequate. To make a call from a post office on the west coast of Demerara to Georgetown, a distance of perhaps less than ten miles, may take anything up to one hour because of the shortage of lines across the mouth of the Demerara river. Internal telecommunications are operated by the government Post Office; external services by Cable and Wireless (W.I.) Ltd. It is entirely possible that Georgetown may some day be an important port serving the northern part of Brazil as well as the whole of British Guiana. The main drawback to the development of the port of Georgetown is the bar across the mouth of the Demerara river over which there is a controlling depth of only nine feet mean low water at spring tide. This makes it impossible for really large vessels to cross the bar and bauxite for example is shipped in small ocean-going vessels. There is a fair amount of ocean-going traffic amounting to about 1,000 steam vessels a year and in addition there is a large volume of schooner traffic to the islands of the Eastern Caribbean. These schooners, which are locally built, carry anything from rice to charcoal and earthenware pots. FINANCE
AND BANKING The problems of finance and banking in a country like British Guiana reflect very accurately some of the basic problems of economic development and the difficulties of establishing local autonomy in economic policy. The currency of British Guiana has, since 1951, been uniform with that of the other territories of the British Caribbean except Jamaica and British Honduras. At present Jamaica, which was a member of the West Indies Federation, has its own currency, while British Guiana, which never was a member, participates in a common currency board with the eastern territories of the federation. The currency in circulation is designated in dollars and cents but is based on sterling; $1=4s. 2d., which means that 1 cent = ½d. The notes issued by the Currency Board are backed 100 per cent. by sterling reserves held in the form of cash or Commonwealth securities, which seems unduly cautious, and under these circumstances they are naturally fully convertible into sterling. There is no central bank in British Guiana, nor is there any kind of money market so that the government is unable to issue bills for short-term adjustments in its financial programme.[13] The two commercial banks operating in the colony, Barclay’s Bank D.C.O. and the Royal Bank of Canada, follow the kind of policy one might expect from foreign concerns; they take no risks. The World Bank Mission remarked unfavourably upon their conservative policy which leads them to invest nearly all their assets outside the colony and to lend locally only for short-term purposes. Another result of the absence of any locally-controlled bank is that the lending rates of the commercial banks follow exactly those of the United Kingdom. Manipulation of the bank rate in the United Kingdom has become one of the principal methods of control over the national economy; British Guiana has to share the effect of that control, irrespective of how appropriate it may be to her economic situation. The absence of a local money market makes it difficult for Guianese capital to find outlets at home and much of it is invested abroad. Local investors would more readily put their money into local enterprises if there were proper opportunities to do so, but the main enterprises connected with sugar and bauxite are virtually closed and proper mechanisms do not exist for channelling funds into new enterprises. The insurance companies play some part in that they make loans but these are mainly for house purchase which is a particularly unadventurous sort of investment. In a country such as British Guiana the whole system of finance should be organized around the necessity for economic growth and this aim should colour all financial thinking. This is by no means the case as yet. After the institution of Crown Colony government in 1928 caution became the keynote of government financial policy and a balanced budget became its goal. This goal was achieved during the war because of rapidly increased government revenues and limited expenditure. The upward trend of revenue continued after the war, the budget continued to be balanced and to show surpluses and the general conservatism of the government’s policy was maintained. Development expenditure was engaged in on an increasing scale in both the private and public sectors of the economy. But much of the drive for this came from Britain. The sugar industry embarked upon a large-scale programme of capital investment to replace plant that had run down during the war, and the bauxite companies continued to invest money in plant. Government expenditure on anything outside the normal essential services came to be classed as ‘development expenditure’. Funds came into the country from Development and Welfare grants given by the United Kingdom government and these were applied to various projects considered to be necessary, useful, or desirable. Revenue ‘surpluses’, as they were called, began to be applied to such things as the provision of social services and public buildings. The World Bank Mission remarked upon the steady increase in expenditure on social welfare programmes and the relative decline in government expenditure on economically productive resources. This bias towards welfare expenditure arose partly from the aftermath of the disturbances which swept the Caribbean just before the war and the subsequent recommendations of the Royal Commission which investigated their causes. It was the sudden awareness of the neglect into which these colonies had fallen and the low standard of living of their people which was mainly responsible for the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. In the absence of any adequate knowledge of the social and economic background of the territory and a very real absence of skills for economic planning within the government (coupled with a reluctance to engage in any radical activities that might upset the traditional pattern too abruptly), the result was to try to improve living conditions by the direct method. This has the grave disadvantage of raising standards of living without a commensurate increase in productivity. It would be wrong to suggest that there was no increase in production during this period or that there was no awareness of the general problem. The sugar industry was in a much better position than it had ever been in before because of the guaranteed markets and prices based on the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. The production of rice was also increasing because of the favourable prices obtaining in the West Indian market. But the fact remained that these two industries are not capable of indefinite extension and relatively little serious consideration was being given to future developments in the economy as a whole. The World Bank Mission recommended a five-year development programme in which about $65 million would be spent between 1954 and 1958, and they pointed out that past experience had shown that the government could if it so wished find most of this from within the country, rather than relying heavily upon external loans and pursuing an extremely conservative financial policy at home. The bulk of government revenue is derived from indirect taxes, of which customs and excise duties are the most important. In 1959 the total revenue was $48,679,637, of which 47.24 per cent. was derived from customs and excise duties, 34.39 per cent. from income-tax (the bulk of it being levied upon companies), and 14.83 per cent. from all other sources such as licences, court fees, post offices, internal revenue, and so on. On the advice of the World Bank Mission, expenditure was divided into two separate accounts, recurrent and development expenditure. Recurrent expenditure amounted to $45,564,880 and expenditure under the development budget to $18,757,678 in 1959. The largest expenditure from the development funds was $7,797,035 on water control, closely followed by housing which was the biggest item in previous years. As in previous years there was a surplus of revenue over expenditure on the recurrent costs budget and this, with a part of the surplus balance carried over from 1958, was appropriated to the Development Fund. The rest of the money for the development budget came from Colonial Development and Welfare grants ($4,421,030) and from loans. The total public debt of the country stood at $89,368,852 (£18,618,511) at the end of 1959. Of this amount only $l7,872,150 represents loans raised in the country, the rest being public loans raised in the United Kingdom, an H.M. Government exchequer loan (1958), loans raised by the Crown Agents under the Intercolonial Loans Scheme, and C.D. & W. loans. Since 1953 steps have been taken to implement as much as possible of the plan recommended by the World Bank Mission, but the suspension of the constitution in 1953 and the subsequent reversion of complete control to the Governor and the Colonial Office led to a period of increased spending on welfare-type programmes as well as to the influx of a large number of persons and agencies bent on improving conditions as rapidly as possible so as to remove the dissatisfactions on which support of a radical party was thought to rest. Housing became the pivot of the new programme and some excellent schemes were carried out, both in Georgetown and in the rural areas. It is not possible to discuss the items of the development programme at length here but the main result of the large increase in expenditure has been to put more money into circulation in the form of salaries, outright grants, loans for self-help projects, and wages. This has in turn stimulated the growth of service industries and consumer expenditure, which in the Guianese economy means imports. Relatively little of the expenditure is likely to lead to increased production in the basic economy in the very near future, but the investment in drainage and irrigation, agricultural research, roads, and various kinds of surveys will be of long-term value. The development programme itself is discussed more fully below. Before concluding this short discussion of finance and banking, mention should be made of the fact that facilities have been made available under the development programme for the provision of credit to farmers and other persons engaged in productive enterprises, as well as for the construction of houses. The British Guiana Credit Corporation was formed on the suggestion of the World Bank Mission and after 1954 became the chief agency for the distribution of loans. These loans were distributed through a series of Regional Development Committees. In addition to this new source of finance, Cooperative Credit Banks continued to operate to provide mainly short-term loans to rice farmers. THE
BOOKER GROUP The Booker Group of companies is of such great importance in the economic, social, and political life of the country that it merits separate discussion. It has already been noted that increasing centralization of control in the sugar industry has produced much greater efficiency. The desirability of such developments for British Guiana is indisputable. Modern efficient techniques of management are introduced and set the pattern of bureaucratic efficiency for the rest of the society. Why then should Bookers’ face a major problem in convincing some, if not most, Guianese of their usefulness and good intentions? The present organization of the Booker Group is relatively new, having been devised in accordance with ideas of good management and to introduce a measure of decentralization into a growing and extremely diverse economic empire. The London company of Booker Brothers, McConnell & Company, Ltd, is the end-product of a process of amalgamation and incorporation of a large number of separate enterprises ranging from sugar-planting in British Guiana to selling carpets in London and automobiles in Canada. The activities in British Guiana are easily the most important, supplying 65 per cent. of the profits in 1953-7.[14] Over the same period activities in the United Kingdom supplied 19 per cent. of the profits, in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and the Union of South Africa 11 per cent. and in Canada 5 per cent. The Board of Directors of Booker Brothers, McConnell & Company, Ltd, constitutes the ‘Group Parent Board’ with general authority over the Boards of the various Operating Companies in the group. There are eighty-two of these Operating Companies, and in British Guiana, Central Africa, and Canada there are local Group Committees to act as co-ordinating bodies for local operations. By any standards this is large-scale business organization and the wide range of different activities involved makes it a very complex group to control. In British Guiana Bookers’ are involved in the following activities: sugar planting and processing; rum and gin manufacture and distribution; foundry operations; practically every branch of store-keeping; drug manufacture; printing; balata collection; petroleum marketing; insurance agencies; coastal and trans-Atlantic shipping; and numerous interests in smaller enterprises held by Bookers’ Industrial Holdings Ltd. In the words of the Chairman of the Group Parent Board, Sir Jock Campbell: Briefly: responsibility for the management of each Operating Company is placed fairly and squarely upon the shoulders of its own Board. The Boards of the Companies throughout the Group are composed of men, and a few women, of a calibre perfectly capable of directing the affairs of independent Public Companies. But in fact these are not independent Public Companies. The members of the Group Parent Board have to remember that, however much they may decentralise and delegate, however complete their confidence in their colleagues, they, and they alone, are ultimately responsible to Bookers’ Shareholders—the owners of the business—for the stewardship of their property and for the success or failure of the business. This
is the main
fact to be
borne in
mind in any
discussion
of
Bookers’
place and
future in
British
Guiana; the
ultimate
control of a
very large
slice of the
Guianese
economy is
vested in a
London Board
of Directors
owing its
main loyalty
to the
shareholders.
The
question
arises as to
whether the
interests of
Bookers’
shareholders
coincide
with the
interests of
the Guianese
people,
whether
those
interests
are
irreconcilably
opposed, or
whether some
working
compromise
is possible
which
enables
British
Guiana to
benefit from
Bookers’
operations
without
paying an
impossibly
high price
in loss of
economic
independence. There
is no doubt
that
Bookers’
economic
enterprises
contribute
greatly to
the material
well-being
of Guianese;
nor is there
any doubt
that the
various
Booker
companies
are better
run than
those of
most of
their
competitors.
Bookers’
shops and
stores
provide
excellent
service,
they are
clean, well
stocked,
and provide
good wages
and working
conditions
for their
employees.
As was
pointed out
previously
Bookers’
Sugar
Estates Ltd
are
establishing
a pattern of
bureaucratic
organization
which is
already the
most
efficient in
the country
and in which
Guianese can
learn the
kind of
skills
necessary to
the running
of a modern
economic and
administrative
system. The
skill and
efficiency
with which
Bookers’
is managed
today is a
relatively
new
phenomenon
and advanced
techniques
of
management
have been
grafted on
to
pre-existing
structures
without
being able
to change
them
overnight.
The economy
and
efficiency
with which
the Booker
Group is run
is made
possible by
its size and
the
diversity of
its
activities,
but this
size and
spread also
makes
Bookers’
highly
visible.
When
Guianese
refer to
their
country as
‘Bookers’
Guiana’
they refer
not only to
the fact
that the
firm has a
hand in
practically
every
economic
activity in
the country
but also to
the fact
that the
real control
centre of
Bookers’
is in
London, that
it is an
English
company run
almost
wholly by
Englishmen
answerable
to English
shareholders,
and that in
the past
Guianese
were rarely
able to
aspire to
any but the
lower status
positions
within its
hierarchy.
Some of
these
factors may
not have
been so
objectionable
had the
British not
behaved very
much as a
dominant
caste group.
The
prevailing
sentiment
among
European
staffs has
been in
favour of a
sharp
dividing
line between
themselves
and coloured
Guianese
while
maintaining
an
officially
open and
tolerant
attitude.
This is the
‘hypocrisy’
which is so
irritating
and makes
many West
Indians
prefer the
clear-cut
lines of the
American
South. It is
pointless to
look upon
the racial
snobbery of
the
Europeans as
either the
natural
reaction of
an
expatriate
group or as
a compound
of
individual
moral
failings.
The fact is
that most of
them merely
slipped into
a pattern of
comfortable
conformity
in which
certain
things were
‘done’
and others
‘not
done’. It
was the
‘done’
thing to
invite
Coloured
people of a
certain
class level
to sugar
estate staff
dances or
parties, but
rarely to
private
parties or
informal
gatherings
in the home;
it was
permissible
for young
British
bachelors to
have casual
affairs with
local girls
but they
were not
expected to
marry them;
it was
permissible
to mix with
the local
Coloured élite
at public
functions
but not to
belong to
the same
club or
lodge.
These
rituals of
avoidance
were, and
are, not
peculiar to
the
Europeans.
They extend
right
through the
society
which tends
to
precipitate
its various
ethnic
elements
into
different
compartments
for certain
social
purposes.
But the
whole system
depends upon
the pattern
of
domination
by one group
defined in
terms of
colour. If
the pattern
of white
political
and economic
domination
were to be
swept away,
not by
depressing
the position
of one
colour-defined
group and
elevating
the position
of another
but by the
substitution
of equal
opportunity
for all,
then the
system would
begin to
change all
the way
down. The
‘new
men’ of
Bookers’
have
inherited
these
patterns and
this form of
social
structure
and find
them
something of
an
encumbrance
in the
rational
organization
of their
enterprises.
They are not
‘planters’
in the old
sense of the
term and are
much less
concerned
with
maintaining
their
position
within a
prestige
hierarchy
than with
maximizing
production
and profits
and
efficiency.
On the other
hand it is
difficult
for them to
know what to
do to alter
the climate
within which
they
operate. To
offset some
of the
criticisms
of
exploitation
and English
dominance
various
measures
have been
taken in
recent
years. There
has been a
flood of
expenditure
on
‘welfare’
for sugar
workers,
including
the
provision of
community
centres,
sports
fields,
cricket
coaches,
clinics, crèches,
housing
loans,
co-operative
shops, and
home
economists. Personnel
and Public
Relations
Officers
have been
appointed
resulting in
vigorous
attempts to
persuade
Guianese
that
Bookers’
have the
welfare of
the country
at heart and
that they
have
something
positive to
contribute
to its
development.
Whatever
the merits
of the case
Guianese are
difficult to
convince on
this point
and the very
paternalism
of many of
these
efforts
arouses more
antagonism
than it
allays. The
simple fact
is that many
Guianese
would like
to run their
own affairs
even if they
run them
somewhat
less
efficiently,
or even
downright
badly, and
in the field
of welfare
activities
at least
this could
easily be
accomplished
by the
speedy
implementation
of Dr
Marshall’s
proposals
for local
government
reform.[15] What
will happen
in the
future is
extremely
difficult to
predict.
If
British
Guiana were
politically
independent
there might
be an open
conflict
between
Bookers’
and an
independent
government.
On
the other
hand there
would also
be the
possibility
of some sort
of
partnership
in the
process of
economic
development,
a
possibility
which cannot
properly
arise so
long as
colonialism
colours the
whole
atmosphere
in which
politicians
and business
men operate.
In
the long run
there is no
reason why
Bookers’
enterprises
should not
be wholly
Guianese,
and the long
run need not
be too long.
For
this to
happen
without the
accompaniment
of bitter
conflict
would demand
more
objectivity
than either
politicians
or business
men perhaps
possess.
Certainly
it would
demand a new
conception
of the role
of British
capitalistic
activities. At
the moment
the policy
of
Bookers’
directors
seems to be
the building
of a bigger,
better, and
somewhat
safer
‘Booker
family’ of
diverse
enterprises.
The
abilities of
the
top-level
management
of a body
like
Bookers’
lie not in
keeping a
number of
industries
ticking over
for the
benefit of
shareholders,
but rather
in the
continuous
creation of
new wealth
through the
skilful
employment
of financial
and other
resources.
They
have
recently
been
frightened
into a
policy of
‘hedging
against
failure in
British
Guiana’ by
buying up
rather
unadventurous
businesses
in places
like England
and Canada.
But
could they
not deploy
their
considerable
resources in
co-operation
with the
British
Guiana or
the
Nyasaland
governments
to develop
new
industries
or public
utilities
with a clear
understanding
that these
would
eventually
pass into
the complete
ownership of
the local
government?
Even
the most
extreme
politician
would find
it rather
difficult to
nationalize
Bookers’
lock, stock,
and barrel
immediately,
but there is
no reason
why
Bookers’
should not
co-operate
in producing
the new
wealth which
would make
it possible
for British
Guiana to
buy them
out.
So
far as
Bookers’
is concerned
the simple
fact is that
the old
British
Empire
framework
within which
they grew up
has gone,
and the
function of
capital
investment
in overseas
territories
has changed.
To
play a
constructive
part in the
world of
today they
will need to
be much more
adaptable
and more
versatile in
the
application
of their
entrepreneurial
talents and
financial
assets; they
must in fact
turn
themselves
into
miniature
development
companies or
perish.
The
latter
alternative
would not
really help
anyone,
though there
is a danger
that the
political
leaders of a
nationalist
movement may
be tempted
into
increasing
their
attacks upon
such a large
expatriate
concern not
for economic
reasons but
as a means
of creating
or
maintaining
political
solidarity.
Such
attacks
could come
as easily
from the
right wing
as from the
left.
THE
PROBLEM OF
ECONOMIC
GROWTH One
does not
need to
spend very
long in
British
Guiana to
become aware
that the
desire for a
higher
standard of
living is
widespread
and
insistent. The
taste for
consumer
goods has
taken hold;
every
government
will in
future be
judged by
its
activities
in relation
to the
standard of
living.
Small-talk
at every
level of the
society is
likely to
revolve
around the
same
question and
one may be
sure that
there will
be as many
solutions to
the problem
of economic
growth as
there are
participants
in the
discussion.
The
problems and
the
discussions
are not new
but in the
last twenty
years they
have been
given fresh
impetus, and
the economic
aid and
technical
skills which
have become
available
open up
entirely new
prospects,
provided
that the
necessary
internal
readjustments
which will
make such
aid
effective
can be
accomplished.
At
the moment
the
atmosphere
in British
Guiana tends
to be one of
despair at
the
magnitude of
the problem,
though
sometimes
this despair
gives way to
wild hopes
of some
simple and
grand
solution;
perhaps the
imminent
discovery of
oil or the
magical
effects of a
road to
Brazil.
In
practice
there is a
tendency to
try a bit of
everything
and what is
really
lacking is a
long-term
effort to
bring plans
to fruition.
Compared
with many
underdeveloped
countries
British
Guiana has a
number of
assets which
should be of
great value
in the
development
process.
The
population
is mainly
literate and
already
oriented
towards the
kind of
goals and
activities
characteristic
of more
developed
countries.
There
is no
tribalism to
contend with
and the
family
structure is
not likely
to be a
serious bar
to the
development
of social
mobility.
Health
is
reasonably
good;
malnutrition
may be
present but
it is not a
serious
problem.
The
country is
vast in
comparison
to the size
of the
population
and it has a
number of
easily
exploited
natural
resources
such as
timber and
bauxite.
Why,
then, the
atmosphere
of gloom and
despondency
and
frustration
which
characterizes
the country?
Before
attempting
to answer
such a
general
question it
is necessary
to see what
sort of
attempts are
being made
to speed up
development,
by whom they
are made,
and what
results have
been
achieved so
far.
It
is not
worth-while
going back
too far for
the purpose
of assessing
local
thought on
the subject.
Immediately
after the
1939-45
war the pace
of change
began to
speed up
considerably
and the idea
of
development
planning as
a special
activity of
government
was
introduced. An
adviser on
economic
development
was
appointed
and a
ten-year
development
plan drawn
up.
The
initiative
for these
preliminary
steps came
almost
entirely
from the
Colonial
Office in
the United
Kingdom.[16]
Special
committees
were
appointed to
make
suggestions
for
development
expenditure
in all the
principal
fields.
The
reports of
these
committees
were
collated,
estimates
drawn up,
and the
whole thing
then
forwarded to
London for
possible
action.
British
Guiana was
allotted a
total of
$20.7
million from
Colonial
Development
and Welfare
funds, this
sum to be
spent on the
more
obvious,
urgent
necessities,
and it was
spread over
a large
number of
specific
schemes.
The
necessity
for some
more
rigorous
plan and
determination
of
priorities
soon became
evident and
early in
1953, on the
eve of the
constitutional
changes, the
mission from
the
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development,
which has
already been
referred to
above,
visited the
country to
draw up a
comprehensive
plan for
development
over the
next five
years.
This
was
submitted to
the
government
in July 1953
and finally
published at
the end of
the year.
The
report of
the mission
was not very
optimistic,
nor was it a
great
improvement
upon the
development
plans which
had been
drawn up by
the local
committees.
The
development
of the
interior was
dismissed as
being too
difficult so
long as the
potentialities
of soils and
mineral
resources
are
imperfectly
known.
The
idea of
developing
local
manufacturing
industries
was
discouraged
on the
grounds that
the local
market is
too small;
the
continuation
of
substantial
imports of
such things
as flour,
cloth,
petrol, and
machinery
was
envisaged.
The
main
emphasis of
the plan was
on the
development
of the basic
resources of
the
coastlands
and the
expansion of
production
of primary
products.
The
development
of
hydro-electric
power was
described as
‘highly
problematical’.
No
doubt the
plan could
be described
as being
realistic;
it was not
exciting and
hardly
conducive to
a basic
change of
attitude.
The
plan was
received in
Georgetown
in July.
In
October,
after the
constitution
had been
suspended,[17]
the Governor
complained
that the
deposed
ministers of
the
People’s
Progressive
Party had
done nothing
to implement
the plan and
that he
would go
ahead with
the various
schemes at
once.
A
provisional
two-year
programme
for the
years 1954
and 1955 was
drawn up,
the
estimated
cost being
$44 (B.W.I.)
million.
This
programme
was as much
influenced
by the
recent
political
events as by
any
suggestions
put forward
by the World
Bank
Mission.
Whereas
they had
clearly
stated that
expenditure
on basic
resources
must have
priority
over the
provision of
social
services,
the new
development
programme
laid
overwhelming
emphasis
upon the
immediate
correction
of those
conditions
which it was
thought
might play
into the
hands of
‘communism’.
Some
difficulty
was
experienced
in spending
the amount
of money
that was
made
available
and by the
end of 1954
only $9
(B.W.I.)
million had
been
disposed of.
This
amount was
increased in
the
following
year as the
new agencies
for housing,
land
settlement,
road
development,
and for
making loans
on minimal
security
became
established.
The
injection of
such large
amounts of
capital into
the country
did have
marked
effects,
though it is
debatable as
to whether
they were
entirely
desirable.
In a
recent study
of the
national
income, Dr
Carleen
O’Loughlin
has
demonstrated
that the
bulk of
investment
which could
be regarded
as
‘productive’
went into
the
strengthening
of the rice
industry,
and she
calculates
that this is
not likely
to yield a
very high
return for
capital
invested.[18]
The
increase in
production
of rice,
even if
markets
continue to
be
favourable,
is not
likely to be
capable of
maintaining
the higher
standard of
living based
upon
increased
imports
which has
been
stimulated
by the large
capital
expenditures.
In
1956 a new
development
plan for the
years
1956–60
was prepared
and accepted
by the
Secretary of
State for
the Colonies
and the
local
government.
This
plan carries
forward the
same general
policy as
the previous
plans,
providing
for a total
expenditure
of
$91,350,000
(B.W.I.)
over the
five-year
period.
The
two new
items were
provision
for
expenditure
on a
rural-electrification
scheme and
on
preliminary
work on a
road through
to Lethem on
the
Brazilian
border.
Apart
from these
two schemes
the plan
provides for
the usual
expenditures
on drainage
and
irrigation,
agricultural
research and
development,
social
services,
communications
(meaning
mainly roads
along the
coast and
some
improvement
of rail and
ferry
services),
and further
geological
investigations.
All
these plans,
expenditures,
and
activities
are having
some effect
quite
obviously,
but there is
no doubt
that the
progress
made is much
less than
expected and
the number
of delays,
setbacks,
and failures
is great.
It is
as well to
emphasize
that
development
is taking
place and
that the
situation is
not by any
means
hopeless.
Increases
in
productivity
have taken
place in
nearly every
industry and
substantial
investments
are being
made in
bauxite
processing. But
there is
still an
atmosphere
of gloom
over the
country and
few people
are
satisfied
with the
rate of
development
or with
future
prospects.
This
contrasts
sharply with
the much
more buoyant
and hopeful
atmosphere
in Trinidad
and Jamaica.
Is
there any
answer to
the question
that was
posed
earlier as
to why this
should be so? The
first major
problem
confronting
the country
is a lack of
trained
personnel
capable of
formulating
development
plans and
supervising
every stage
of their
execution.
The
success of a
company like
Bookers’
is due
almost
entirely to
the quality
of its
organization
and
personnel.
By
comparison
the British
Guiana
public
service is
crude and
out of date.
The
number of
trained
economists,
or even
persons with
some
training in
economics,
on the
permanent
establishment
is
infinitesimally
small.
Statistical
services are
practically
non-existent;
in 1958 the
Statistics
Bureau
consisted of
one trained
statistician
and a few
clerks, and
the decision
had been
taken to
limit his
activities
to advice
and the
co-ordination
of
statistics
prepared and
published by
existing
departments.
The
practice has
been to
invite
‘experts’
to carry out
surveys
whenever a
particular
problem
arose and
the natural
consequence
of this
procedure
has been to
produce a
series of
technical
reports
which are
difficult to
interpret
and in the
absence of
trained
personnel
the lessons
they contain
are
difficult to
apply.
The
translation
of basic
data and
various
recommendations
into
workable
policy is a
highly
complex
procedure
and it is
desirable
that it
should be
done by
people who
are a part
and parcel
of the
permanent
structure of
government.
The
intelligent
use of
visiting
experts
depends upon
the presence
of a
well-trained
planning
staff.
Without
it the
expert
comes,
spends a
long time
searching
for the most
elementary
information,
makes a
report which
inevitably
raises a
series of
new
questions,
and the bulk
of his work
is quietly
forgotten
when he
leaves.
The
necessity
for a
well-equipped
Bureau of
Statistics
was clearly
seen by Mr
E. Mills in
his report
on the
public
service
published as
long ago as
1953.[19]
He
considered
that such a
Bureau is a
normal and
necessary
part of
modern
government
and he
detailed the
staff and
machines
which he
considered
to be
necessary.
It is
all the more
surprising
therefore
that a
contrary
decision
should have
been taken
on the
advice of a
Colonial
Office
statistician
to limit the
size and
functions of
the Bureau
to the point
where it
became
little more
than an
advisory
office to
individual
departments
and the
repository
of a small
library of
books on
statistics.
Apart
from the
creation of
a central
planning and
statistics
organization
through
which the
process of
economic
development
could be
initiated,
encouraged,
and kept
under
constant
review by
local people
with a
continuous
interest and
an
accumulating
experience,
there is
also obvious
need for
further
training at
almost every
level of the
public
service and
in all its
branches. What
is
particularly
lacking here
as in most
underdeveloped
countries is
good
supervisory
personnel.
Without
a class of
efficient
‘expediters’,
as they are
sometimes
called in
the jargon
of American
industrial
sociology,
plans do not
get properly
implemented.
Much
more could
be done in
training
people for
work at the
intermediate
levels in
all
government
organizations,
either in a
special
school of
administration
set up in
the country
or through
co-operation
with other
territories
such as
Trinidad.
Something
is already
being done
to make good
these
deficiencies
through the
public and
business
administration
courses held
at the
University
College of
the West
Indies,
through
special
extra-mural
department
courses for
trade union
leaders,
local
government
officers and
teachers,
and through
the
provision of
scholarships
to study
abroad.
But
this is such
a crucial
matter that
it deserves
even more
attention,
especially
as there is
a growing
number of
high school
students
coming on to
the labour
market. The
fear that
they will
merely form
a
dissatisfied
and
unemployable
element is
the product
of static
and
unimaginative
thinking.
They
are one of
the most
important
assets the
country has
and should
be used to
the limit of
their
capacity.
Apart
from
increased
training and
reorganization
of the
administrative
machine
there is of
course a
need for
much greater
numbers of
skilled
workmen,
engineers,
chemists,
agricultural
experts,
geologists,
and the
like. Something
is being
done to
remedy these
deficiencies
through the
Technical
College and
through the
awarding of
government
scholarships,
but like
other
underdeveloped
countries
many of
these
specialized
skills will
have to be
bought from
outside for
some time to
come.
So
far as is
ascertainable
no attempt
has been
made as yet
to make an
estimate of
the numbers
and kinds of
skills
available,
those in
process of
being
produced and
those likely
to be
required in
terms of
expected
economic
development.
Assuming
that an
abundance of
skills and
capital were
available,
the problem
would still
remain of
where to
apply them.
In
the past the
adequacy of
the staffs
for
implementation
of plans was
assumed and
attention
concentrated
upon where
to apply
them.
Quite
rightly,
agriculture
has always
been
accorded
high
priority,
and in
British
Guiana
agriculture
means
drainage and
irrigation.
Whatever
other
developments
take place
it is
certain that
the fertile
coastal
lands will
continue
to be one of
the major
economic
resources of
the country;
whether it
will always
be
economically
profitable
to use them
is another
question but
during the
foreseeable
future there
is no
alternative.
Much
discussion
has revolved
around the
drainage and
irrigation
schemes
drawn up by
Mr
Hutchinson
who was
Consulting
Engineer to
the British
Guiana
government
from 1949 to
1952.
Speaking
very
generally on
a highly
complex
subject one
might say
that Mr
Hutchinson
recommended
that instead
of
empoldering
limited
areas of
land along
the coast,
steps should
be taken to
provide
comprehensive
schemes
which would
enclose
large areas
of land
between the
major
rivers,
these blocks
to be
irrigated by
large water
conservancies
situated
some thirty
or so miles
from the
coast and
supplemented
by water
drawn from
the rivers.
He
made outline
plans for
many of
these
schemes but
a good deal
of survey
work and
detailed
designing
was left to
be done.
Dr
Jagan and
other
Guianese
politicians
allege that
Mr
Hutchinson
was
vehemently
opposed by
the sugar
interests,
working
through the
government,
and that he
eventually
resigned in
disgust and
frustration.
According
to Dr Jagan,
the schemes
were opposed
by the sugar
interests
for two
reasons:
first
because they
would make
so much land
available
for peasant
settlement
that the
sugar
estates
would be
left without
their
reservoir of
cheap
labour, and
secondly
because they
would cost
too much
money.
Whatever
the truth of
the matter
various
decisions
were taken
to proceed
with
modified
schemes
rather than
press ahead
immediately
with the
major
projects.
Both
the World
Bank Mission
and a
subsequent
investigator,
Mr Gerald
Lacey, have
endorsed the
soundness of
the general
outline of
the
Hutchinson
schemes and
some of them
are by now
under
construction.
Contracts
for work on
large
schemes in
the
Courantyne
and West
Demerara
areas have
been awarded
to
expatriate
firms
because of
the acute
shortage of
engineers
and
machinery in
the country.
The
basis of all
present
agricultural
policy is
the
encouragement
and
extension of
peasant
farming.
This
is an
extremely
vague
concept but
it is
assumed that
the rapidly
increasing
population
will have to
be settled
on small
family farms
and it is
further
assumed that
there is at
present and
will
continue to
be a
definite
land
shortage.
It is
true that
there has
been an
enormous
increase in
the area of
land under
rice since
the war and
the present
favourable
prices have
stimulated a
great demand
for
well-drained
land within
easy reach
of the
villages.
Relatively
little
diversification
of crops has
taken place
and large
quantities
of food are
still
imported.
Experiments
in the
cultivation
of cocoa,
cotton,
coffee, and
citrus have
all shown
good results
but a vast
amount of
agricultural
extension
work and
closely
supervised
credit will
be necessary
if they are
to be more
widely
introduced.
The
most active
farmers are
the East
Indians but
they follow
a set
pattern of
activity,
growing
rice,
raising a
few
vegetables
for home
consumption
and sale
locally, and
keeping a
few cattle.
The
idea of a
rational
planned
farming is
non-existent
among them
though they
do operate
fairly
efficiently
within the
limits laid
down by
tradition.
A few
of the
larger
farmers have
a more
business-like
approach and
even the
small
farmers will
adopt new
methods
quickly
enough if
they are
profitable
and can be
accommodated
without too
much
disturbance.
With
the increase
in secondary
education
among the
children of
rice farmers
there is an
excellent
opportunity
to use them
to start
developing
the kind of
increased
government
services
that will be
essential to
the
successful
expansion of
small-scale
farming.
It is
not enough
to give a
man ten or
twenty acres
of land and
leave it at
that.
He
must have
all the
benefits of
a highly
scientific
agriculture
supplied to
him if he is
going to
make full
use of his
land.
That
means not
only
research
units
working on
his behalf
but also a
whole
organizational
canopy must
be spread
over him,
providing
him with
drainage and
irrigation,
correct
fertilizers,
improved
seed,
artificial
insemination
services,
machinery
pools, and a
host of
other
services
including
processing
and
marketing
organizations.
Whether
these things
are provided
by private
enterprise
as in the
experimental
cane-farming
scheme being
run by
Bookers’,
by
co-operatives,
or by the
government,
a prime need
is for
trained
people to
operate the
services,
and the
farmers need
to be
educated to
make maximum
use of the
facilities
that are
available.
A
good start
has already
been made in
the
development
of some of
these
services but
there is
still a
great
shortage of
trained
people.
Many
farmers
never have
any contact
with the
officers who
have to
spread their
efforts over
large
districts.
Whether
there is any
possibility
of bringing
about sudden
and
significant
increases in
productivity
by the use
of better
techniques,
fertilizers,
and so on is
very
doubtful,
especially
in the case
of rice
where
intensive
methods and
double
cropping
are already
very
general.
The
most rapid
results and
those that
would
contribute
most to the
development
process are
likely to be
achieved in
the
production
of food for
local
consumption,
including
meat, fish,
eggs and
poultry, as
well as food
crops.
The
construction
of a ham and
bacon
factory a
few years
ago is a
step in the
right
direction. If
agriculture
is basic to
the process
of economic
growth, it
is by no
means
sufficient
to bring
about the
kind of
changes and
the standard
of living
envisaged,
particularly
if it is
confined to
the coastal
area.
Relatively
rapid
results
might be
expected
from the
exploitation
of forest
resources as
a supplement
to increased
agricultural
productivity,
but here the
question of
what Rostow
calls
‘social
overhead
capital’
looms
alarmingly.[20]
Quite
apart from
the
deficiencies
already
noted in
certain
kinds of
education
and
administrative
skills there
are the
major
problems of
power and
communications.
The
half-hearted
approach
which has
been taken
towards
these
questions is
typical of
the lack of
real
understanding
of the
urgency and
seriousness
of the
situation.
There
has long
been talk of
developing
hydro-electric
power and a
small plant
is actually
in operation
at
Tumatumari
Falls
supplying
power for
the
operation of
two dredgers
in the
goldfields.
Apart
from this
the
development
of
hydro-electric
power is
still in the
very
preliminary
experimental
stage.
The
World Bank
Mission
discounted
any
development
of
hydro-electric
power in the
immediate
future but
said nothing
about the
alternatives. The
Demerara
Bauxite
Company made
some more
detailed
investigations
in connexion
with their
new alumina
plant, and
there is a
possibility
of some
development
work in
conjunction
with the
government.
At
the moment,
however, the
position is
that the
main users
such as
sugar
plantations
and bauxite
mines
generate
their own
electricity,
the rural
areas have
no electric
supplies
except that
produced by
small wind
chargers or
domestic
plants, New
Amsterdam
has a plant
run by the
Municipal
Council,
Bartica has
a small
plant run by
a private
company, and
Georgetown
is supplied
with power
from the
thermal
generators
operated by
the Demerara
Electric
Company, a
private
Canadian-owned
concern.
A
$5,323,000
scheme for
the
electrification
of the rural
areas was
approved and
included in
the
1956–60
development
plan and a
contract for
its
implementation
awarded to a
British
firm.
In
Georgetown
the
situation
had become
intolerable
by early
1960 because
the
increased
demand had
outstripped
the capacity
of the
Demerara
Electric
Company’s
plant. A
newly
developed
factory for
the
manufacture
of particle
board was
forced to
suspend
operations
for lack of
power, and
whole areas
of the city
were
sometimes
without
light.
It is
obvious
enough that
situations
such as this
should never
be allowed
to develop
and drastic
action by
the
government
is
imperative. To
a certain
extent the
direction
and pace of
economic
development
may be
altered if
British
Guiana
decides to
participate
in the West
Indian
Federation,
but it is
doubtful
whether the
basic
pattern
would be
greatly
affected. It
would mean a
somewhat
greater
certainty of
a market for
rice,
especially
if federal
planning
resulted in
a limit on
the
development
of rice
industries
in the other
territories.
It
would mean
that British
Guiana would
lose revenue
on some
imports
especially
when the
industrial
development
of the other
territories
is more
advanced,
but on the
other hand
she would
have markets
for some of
her own
manufactures.
Unless
she were to
become a
wholly
agricultural
area and
supplier of
raw
materials to
the
industrial
centres of
other
territories,
which is
unlikely,
there would
still be a
pressing
need for the
development
of local
industries
and
therefore of
the
prerequisites
of industry,
namely
power,
communications,
skill, and
organizing
ability.
Whether
British
Guiana joins
the
federation
or not the
desirability
of interior
development
and of the
establishment
of a link to
Brazil is
obvious.
Even
limited
communications
and the
provision of
basic
services
could open
up a
considerable
amount of
land on the
banks of the
principal
rivers, land
that was
abandoned
nearly 200
years ago.
The process of economic growth and its deliberate stimulation is a highly complex matter about which an increasing number of books is being written, and in all of them attention is directed towards the social and political framework within which growth is to take place.[21] |